Wednesday, February 5, 2014

MAESTRO-II: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today's item from the NSA's Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:
MAESTRO-II (TS//SI//REL) MAESTRO-II is a miniaturized digital core packaged in a Multi-Chip Module (MCM) to be used in implants with size constraining concealments.
(TS//SI//REL) MAESTRO-II uses the TAO standard implant architecture. The architecture provides a robust, reconfigurable, standard digital platform resulting in a dramatic performance improvement over the obsolete HC12 microcontroller based designs. A development Printed Circuit Board (PCB) using packaged parts has been developed and is available as the standard platform. The MAESTRO-II Multi-Chip-Module (MCM) contain an ARM7 microcontroller, FPGA, Flash and SDRAM memories.
Status: Available -- On The Shelf
Unit Cost: $3-4K
Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.
Finally -- I think this is obvious, but many people are confused -- I am not releasing these documents. Spiegel released these documents in December. Every national intelligence service, Internet organized crime syndicate, and clued terrorist organization has already poured over these pages. It's us who hasn't really looked at, or talked about, these pages. That's the point of these daily posts.

Hacking Airline Lounges for Free Meals

I think this is a great hack:
A man bought a first-class ticket and used it to have free meals and drinks at the airport's VIP lounge almost every day for nearly a year, Kwong Wah Yit Poh reported. The itinerary for the ticket was found to have been changed more than 300 times within a year, and the owner of the ticket used it to enjoy the facilities at the airport's VIP lounge in Xi'an in Shaanxi, China.
[...]
When the ticket's validity was almost up, the passenger cancelled it for a refund.
It's such a weird occurrence that I'm not even sure it's worth bothering to defend against.

Tuesday, February 4, 2014

JUNIORMINT: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today's item from the NSA's Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:
JUNIORMINT (TS//SI//REL) JUNIORMINT is a digital core packaged in both a mini Printed circuit Board (PCB), to be used in typical concealments, and a miniaturized Flip Chip Module (FCM), to be used in implants with size constraining concealments.
(TS//SI//REL) JUNIORMINT uses the TAO standard implant architecture. The architecture provides a robust, reconfigurable, standard digital platform resulting in a dramatic performance improvement over the obsolete HC12 microcontroller based designs. A mini Printed Circuit Board (PCB) using packaged parts will be developed and will be available as the standard platform for applications requiring a digital core. The ultra-miniature Flip Chip Module (FCM) will be available for challenging concealments. Both will contain an MRM9 microcontroller, FPGA, Flash, SDRAM and DDR2 memories.
Status: Availability -- mini-PCB and Dev Board by April 2009, FCM by June 2010
Unit Cost: Available Upon Request
Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

Monday, February 3, 2014

CSEC Surveillance analysis of IP and user data

The most recent story from the Snowden documents is from Canada: it claims the CSEC (Communications Security Establishment Canada) used airport Wi-Fi information to track travelers. That's not really true. What the top-secret presentation shows is a proof-of-concept project to identify different IP networks, using a database of user IDs found on those networks over time, and then potentially using that data to identify individual users. This is actually far more interesting than simply eavesdropping on airport Wi-Fi sessions. Between Boingo and the cell phone carriers, that's pretty easy.
The researcher, with the cool-sounding job-title of "tradecraft developer," started with two weeks' worth of ID data from a redacted "Canadian Special Source." (The presentation doesn't say if they compelled some Internet company to give them the data, or if they eavesdropped on some Internet service and got it surreptitiously.) This was a list of userids seen on those networks at particular times, presumably things like Facebook logins. (Facebook, Google, Yahoo and many others are finally using SSL by default, so this data is now harder to come by.) They also had a database of geographic locations for IP addresses from Quova (now Neustar). The basic question is whether they could determine what sorts of wireless hotspots the IP addresses were.
You'd expect airports to look different from hotels, and those to look different from offices. And, in fact, that's what the data showed. At an airport network, individual IDs are seen once, and briefly. At hotels, individual IDs are seen over a few days. At an office, IDs are generally seen from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM, Monday through Friday. And so on.
Pretty basic so far. Where it gets interesting his how this kind of dataset can be used. The presentation suggests two applications. The first is the obvious one. If you know the ID of some surveillance target, you can set an alarm when that target visits an airport or a hotel. The presentation points out that "targets/enemies still target air travel and hotels"; but more realistically, this can be used to know when a target is traveling.
The second application suggested is to identify a particular person whom you know visited a particular geographical area on a series of dates/times. The example in the presentation is a kidnapper. He is based in a rural area, so he can't risk making his ransom calls from that area. Instead, he drives to an urban area to make those calls. He either uses a burner phone or a pay phone, so he can't be identified that way. But if you assume that he has some sort of smart phone in his pocket that identifies itself over the Internet, you might be able to find him in that dataset. That is, he might be the only ID that appears in that geographical location around the same time as the ransom calls and at no other times.
The results from testing that second application were successful, but or slow. The presentation sounds encouraging, stating that something called Collaborative Analysis Research Environment (CARE) is being trialed "with NSA launch assist": presumably technology, money, or both. CARE reduces the run-time "from 2+ hours to several seconds." This was in May 2012, so it's probably all up and running by now. We don't know if this particular research project was ever turned into an operational program, but the CSEC, the NSA, and the rest of the Five Eyes intelligence agencies have a lot of interesting uses for this kind of data.
Since the Snowden documents have been reported on last June, the primary focus of the stories has been the collection of data. There has been very little reporting about how this data is analyzed and used. The exception is the story on the cell phone location database, which has some pretty fascinating analytical programs attached to it. I think the types of analysis done on this data are at least as important as its collection, and likely more disturbing to the average person. These sorts of analysis are being done with all of the data collected. Different databases are being correlated for all sorts of purposes. When I get back to the source documents, these are exactly the sorts of things I will be looking for. And when we think of the harms to society of ubiquitous surveillance, this is what we should be thinking about.

Saturday, February 1, 2014

Everything You Need To Know About SIM Cards In 2014


You’ve probably used a mobile phone for a very long time, meaning you understand that a SIM card gives you your phone number. But what else do you know about this little card? Believe it or not, there’s much more to your SIM card than the ability to use your phone number and store a few contacts. In addition to this, the advent of smartphones creates a new environment in which SIM cards can show an incredible amount of potential. You’ll discover that talking about these little gold-plated pieces of plastic is actually more intriguing than you thought!

simcards-tower
Your subscriber identity module (SIM) card is chiefly a way for your carrier to identify your relationship to it. Much like how an IMEI number identifies the hardware on your phone, the SIM card will give your carrier a way to identify you so that it can route calls in your direction.
SIM cards store different amounts of information, depending on what your carrier gives you. The number ranges anywhere from 32 to 128 kilobytes. You can’t use all that space to store contacts, though. You’ll always have a maximum of 250 contacts. This is because the card has to reserve its remaining space to store things like the short message service center (SMS-C) number (the number that gives you the ability to send text messages), the service provider name (so that the phone immediately recognizes what carrier it has to connect to by default), and other parameters that your carrier might need for your phone to function properly. Once you insert your SIM card, your phone will pull this information out and use whatever is relevant whenever it’s needed.
Perhaps one of the biggest reasons why SIM cards reserve particular areas of their memory is because they have to store a varying number of mobile network codes for roaming purposes. If you’re travelling a lot, you might not get service from your provider in particular areas. Roaming capabilities provided by your SIM card allow you to continue your conversations even without your hometown network.
Your SIM card doesn’t identify itself to a carrier using a phone number. Instead, it uses something known as an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) number. Using this convention, a carrier can immediately disable an old SIM card from a phone that was lost or stolen and immediately move its number (and sometimes even its contacts) to a new SIM.
There are a few types of SIM cards used in regular day-to-day applications. These are found particularly inside of phones:

Mini SIM

simcards-minisim
This is your run-of-the-mill SIM card. You’ve probably grown bored of staring at it. Let’s move on.

Micro SIM

simcards-microsim
This SIM card (size comparison above) is particularly championed by smartphone manufacturers as a significant space-saving measure for phones that have to cram in as much hardware as possible. Real estate is running short, so everything is shrinking. The next SIM, though, takes the entire concept of “think thin” to a whole new level.

Nano SIM

simcards-nanosim
The Nano SIM (right) is just a regular SIM with practically everything shaved off. Phone manufacturers that are desperate to cram as much hardware in as small a space as possible sometimes take these attempts to levels that require something as drastic as a Nano SIM. They’re not just annoyingly small. They’re also effortlessly easy to lose.

Sticker SIM

simcards-stickersim
This isn’t a SIM card, per se, but it’s still interesting. Electronic stickers like the one KnowRoaming offers allow you to supercharge your SIM card with additional features by applying it right on top of the card. KnowRoaming’s sticker lets you have more control of your roaming rates, bypassing the middleman (your carrier) and instead choosing the lowest rates available in whatever country you travel to. When you’re home, the sticker goes to sleep and lets your SIM card handle everything.
Well, I’ve already shown you the sticker SIM. This is just one of the many ways that SIM technology is evolving. Some suggest getting rid of the concept entirely, while others suggest using the SIM card to track stolen goods (I prefer this variation).

IRATEMONK: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today's item from the NSA's Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:
IRATEMONK (TS//SI//REL) IRATEMONK provides software application persistence on desktop and laptop computers by implanting in the hard drive firmware to gain execution through Master Boot Record (MBR) substitution.
(TS//SI//REL) This technique supports systems without RAID hardware that boot from a variety of Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor, and Samsung hard drives. The supported file systems are: FAT, NTFS, EXT3 and UFS.
(TS//SI//REL) Through remote access or interdiction, UNITEDRAKE, or STRAITBAZZARE are used with SLICKERVICAR to upload the hard drive firmware onto the target machine to implant IRATEMONK and its payload (the implant installer).l Once implanted, IRATEMONK's frequency of execution (dropping the payload) is configurable and will occur when the target machine powers on.
Status: Released / Deployed. Ready for Immediate Delivery
Unit Cost: $0
Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.
In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Friday squid blogging: squid T-Shirt

A T-shirt with a drawing of a squid reading.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered.